Yakobson S (1939) Russia and Africa The Slavonic and East European Review 17(51) 623ã¢â‚¬â€œ637

Introduction

In 1977, the Soviet Union's leadership was in a jubilant mood every bit Ethiopia had just switched sides to the socialist camp.¹ By the time of this upshot, the Kremlin had been conducting a renewed offensive on the continent for several years, propping up socialist regimes and 'liberation movements' in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (subsequently Zimbabwe) and South Africa. However contrary to warnings that the Soviets might somewhen 'swallow' all of sub-Saharan Africa,² by 1990 the offensive had fizzled out: ideologically and financially broken, Moscow cut military aid, suspended credit lines, wound down diplomatic representations, airtight cultural centres and ultimately withdrew political support. When rebel forces avant-garde towards Addis Ababa in 1991, Moscow stood idly by as the Derg regime – its former poster child – disintegrated.

Over the course of the next two decades, mail service-Soviet Russia showed little interest in the sub-continent and only in the late 2010s did the Kremlin once again brandish the ambition to play a greater geopolitical role: sub-Saharan Africa remerged in Russian political soapbox and trade and diplomatic traffic picked up. Simultaneously, Moscow revived alumni associations of Africans who studied in the Soviet Spousal relationship and launched initiatives to lure more than students to Russian federation. The Wagner Grouping – a military enterprise connected to the Russian state – also expanded its radius of activeness southward of the Sahara.^three

But what is driving Moscow'southward renewed activism? How different it is from its previous diplomatic thrusts? Tin can a coherent strategy exist discerned behind this push? Finally, how is sub-Saharan Africa reacting to Russia's overtures and what does it mean for the EU?

Why: four reasons behind Russian federation'due south outreach to Africa

Several overlapping and mutually reinforcing factors can help decipher Russia's motivations and objectives. Offset of all, the Soviet Matrimony'southward engagement in sub-Saharan Africa had left a bitter aftertaste in Moscow: the Soviets experienced ephemeral geopolitical gains, while financial costs kept escalating. Indeed, virtually all that remained in the wake of the rapid geopolitical retreat of the 1990s was nearly $17 billion worth of debt that sub-Saharan nations owed to post-Soviet Russia.⁴

This disappointment gradually faded away over time and now, two decades on, Russian ruling elites once more view the African continent equally a geopolitical and business opportunity.⁵ For instance, oil giant Rosneft's search for business concern deals in Republic of angola and Mozambique, countries in which its influential CEO Igor Sechin served equally a war machine translator in 1980s, heralds Russia's shift towards a more than extractive approach.^vi Thus, if earlier engagements led to an overall economic loss, Moscow now aspires to 'keep investments low simply returns high'.^seven

If before engagements led to an overall economic loss, Moscow now aspires to 'keep investments depression but returns high'.

Economically, it aims to gain access to natural resources (oil, gas, diamonds etc.) while boosting exports of agro products (grain), fertilisers, arms and nuclear, digital and space technologies. Militarily, Russia frames itself equally an anti-jihadist strength striving to establish and deepen security ties with African armies and secure access to infrastructure to ensure the resupply and maintenance of its navy. Diplomatically, Russia seeks votes in back up of its positions at the Un (UN) or other political gestures that uphold Moscow'due south diplomatic posture internationally.^viii

The conviction that policies in sub-Saharan Africa can this time bring about quantifiable dividends are interlinked with Russia's bang-up power instincts and its preoccupation with securing the recognition of its global condition. From the Russian indicate of view, sub-Saharan Africa is another battleground where established and rising powers disharmonism for resources, market shares and political influence.^nine Moreover, from 2010 onwards Russia has not derived its great ability condition exclusively from claims of pre-eminence in its immediate neighbourhood; its status is increasingly based on the ability to conduct a global foreign policy. In this regard, one Russian expert recently underscored that "Russia'south policy in Africa shows that our geostrategic interests are wider than it is thought".¹⁰

This quest for condition recognition is re-enforced to some extent past the deterioration of relations between Europe and Russia. Every bit ties soured in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and the sanctions-related costs of waging war in Donbas rose, Moscow doubled its efforts to boost the non-European aspects of its foreign policy. Labelled every bit a 'flanking strategy',¹¹ it seeks to demonstrate that Russia cannot be isolated diplomatically and has feasible economic alternatives.¹² To some degree, it serves to surprise and challenge Europe, gain new levers of influence and thus be able to up the dues beyond the European continent.

Last but not least, a string of military, political or economic successes in the Middle Eastward and North Africa (MENA) have often paved the style for Russia'due south forays into sub-Saharan politics. Start, afterwards boosting grain exports to Egypt since the mid-2000s, Moscow gained and expanded its share in Sudan's wheat market place (from v% to 55%) throughout the 2010s.¹³ Second, Russia capitalised on its intervention in Syria to showcase and gainsay exam its military machine equipment, acquiring new clients in sub-Saharan Africa equally a outcome; its share in arms exports to the region went up from 19% to 28% between 2012 and 2018.¹⁴ Third, Moscow exploited the renewed Russia-Arab republic of egypt partnership to organise the commencement always Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, co-chaired by President Putin and President Sisi and held in Sochi.

There is a high degree of historical continuity here: North Africa traditionally played an of import role in Soviet foreign policy¹⁵ and accomplishments there created the pre-conditions for date with southern Africa. The first conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in Cairo in 1957, sponsored by the Kremlin, set the stage for the 2d one in Conakry in 1960 which facilitated Soviet outreach to African elites. The spider web of partnerships in North Africa served other purposes, too: for instance, in 1967 Soviet planes piloted past Egyptians flew from People's democratic republic of algeria to transport Soviet weapons to Nigeria.¹⁶ Therefore, more oftentimes than not, there was and still is a mental and cloth link between Moscow'southward policy in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.

How: Russia's underdog strategy

Moscow is aware of its quasi-underdog status on the continent and there is a recognition that Russia lacks the resources of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The Soviets could rely on client states to share the fiscal or armed services burden of its policies in Africa: between 1954 and 1968, 30% of the Soviet bloc'due south regional economical assistance to Africa came from Moscow's Eastern European satellites.^xviii Similarly, Republic of cuba, the USSR's Latin American ally, deployed troops to Africa, ofttimes in support of the Soviet calendar.¹⁹ Today, Russia does not have such allies to rely on, something which (combined with its weak economical operation over the terminal decade) explains Moscow'due south attempts to win influence in sub-Saharan Africa on the cheap.

There is some other recognised drawback. During the two decades that Russia was largely absent-minded from sub-Saharan Africa, more than powerful external players filled the vacuum and Soviet-trained ruling elites gradually gave way to a new wave of leaders.^twenty Now, because Russia came tardily to the contest for the future of Africa, information technology faces an uphill struggle to re-establish a position even shut to what it held previously.

These limitations inform and shape Russia'south electric current modus operandi. The Kremlin'south rulebook in sub-Saharan Africa therefore prescribes a maximum use of existent advantages, a renewed outreach to African elites, the utilize of sectoral niches in which Russian federation can be politically and economically competitive, the swift exploitation of new regional openings, and (where possible) cooperation with like-minded nifty powers already entrenched in the continent.

Data: Natural Earth, 2020; 88 unique public sources were consulted when preparing this visual.
Although these cannot be listed individually due to infinite limitations, the v near relied-upon sources were SIPRI, TASS, RIA, MID.ru, Proekt.media.

The Kremlin regards strategic communications (StratCom) every bit an essential component to be fully exploited and create favourable weather for Russia's resurgence. For this reason, only as the Soviet news agency TASS expanded its regional offices in the days of the Cold War, today Sputnik is in the early stages of multiplying its partnership agreements with local land media outlets so every bit to exist able to directly provide what it refers to as 'untold stories'.²¹ While Russian StratCom denigrates sure competitors past constantly referring to the predatory behaviour of European imperial powers in the past,²² it boasts of the fact that information technology does not possess colonial baggage and presents itself²³ as a friend who shares African societies' traditional values, a partner for economic development and a bulwark against security threats.²⁴

In that location is, however, another facet of Russian federation's StratCom, which comes in the form of a 'bundle of services for authorities survival', catered to African leaders.²⁵ The early on mail-Soviet transition period gave rise to a cohort of 'political technologists' in Russia, who helped win elections with the utilize of balloter tricks ranging from fake candidates, rigged opinion polls and kompromat (compromising and/or incriminating fabric) while nevertheless preserving the appearance of a legitimate political process.²⁶ In the 2000s, this political industry connected to flourish and with the Kremlin's patronage entered the cyber domain (bots, trolls, faux web-pages etc.).²⁷ Recently, Moscow identified the usefulness of such 'election assist' as a foreign policy tool and something which could provide a competitive edge in weak states.

Over the last years, the listing of sub-Saharan countries in which Russian spin doctors and/or tolls have operated has rapidly expanded. Although presented as the initiative of individual enterprises, this 'electoral assistance' is normally deployed in parallel with cooperation in the security field, Russia's diplomatic protection in international organisations and/or in some cases, loans. In turn, this helps create entry points and gain the trust of local ruling elites during times when they feel most vulnerable (elections, mass protests). States providing assistance to ward off or inhibit democratic changes and ensuring authoritarian leaders' survival have been labelled 'Black Knights'.²⁸ Russia has long supported such actors in the post-Soviet region, but it has now expanded this model to sub-Saharan Africa.

Russia's 'Black Knight' posture sits well with its extractive approach as its protection does not come free of charge. When shielding local rulers from domestic discontent and international pressure, the Russian regime and its related companies often seek lucrative deals in return.²⁹ Protection is also traded for various diplomatic gains: support in the United nations for Russia's position on Syria, an alignment with Moscow on restrictive cyber norms, or the withdrawal of the recognition of Kosovo, for instance.

When it comes to Africa-related issues in the Un, Russia oft finds itself on the aforementioned side of the argue every bit Prc. The calculation in Moscow is that the feel of mutually beneficial cooperation in Eurasia can be replicated in sub-Saharan Africa.³⁰ Bilaterally, Russian and Chinese diplomats accept pledged to coordinate their corresponding positions on Africa, while the two countries' navies have organised the first articulation drills off the shores of Southward Africa.³¹ Merely this is only half of the story.

Despite this apparent alignment, Moscow as well believes that the increased Chinese presence on the continent (and resultant unease generated amidst African elites) will inadvertently bring virtually opportunities for other great powers. Every bit sub-Saharan African states strive to diversify their international engagements to avoid overdependence on China, Russian federation, with its modest resources but valuable political and security services, might therefore gain traction and play a more agile role³² – as 1 nifty observer put information technology: "at that place is China hysteria in Africa, there is no Russia hysteria in Africa".³³ While Russia'south underdog status can consequently help it to mount a deeper comeback in Africa, the success of this approach very much depends on how the sub-continent reacts to Russia's overtures.

What practice Africans want from Russia?

Russia is only the latest global power to engage in the so-called 'new scramble for Africa'.³⁴ When Vladimir Putin convened representatives from all the 54 countries of Africa in Sochi in October 2019, he did a remarkable job of turning a sequencing of bilateral agreements with African governments into a highly symbolic commemoration of Africa'southward collective ambitions, potential and cocky-determination, while revamping erstwhile bonds and perceptions rooted in the Soviet, Cold-War era.

Russia highlights collaboration over aid, something which is tempting to African leaders who view the W'south outreach as patronising.

According to figures cited by Putin, Russian trade with the African continent rose to $xx billion in 2018.³⁵ However, Northward Africa is responsible for the panthera leo's share of this sum, with Russia accounting for simply around $4 billion of sub-Saharan African merchandise.³⁶ Nevertheless, total regional imports and exports with Russian federation grew by 43% between 2008 and 2018. This should exist compared to trade dynamics with other major partners: imports from the Usa take stagnated, while exports fell by almost lx% over the same period and overall trade with China and India grew by 85%, respectively. This means that Russia is amidst the fastest-growing trade partners for sub-Saharan Africa, yet its relative weight compared to the European union (the largest trading partner, accounting for 25% of imports and 23% of exports) or China (around 12% of total imports and exports) is still negligible and information technology accounts for less than 1% of both Russian and sub-Saharan African global trade.³⁷

What, so, is prompting countries south of the Sahara to consolidate and expand partnerships with Russia? Four explanations can be provided.

Strategic narratives

The get-go explanation has to do with an alignment of strategic narratives in a irresolute world. Times have changed since the Soviet Union's efforts to counter 'Western imperialism' in Africa through Marxist ideology: modern Russia's foreign policy has no such ideological ambitions, yet its narrative continues to stress opposition to Western interference in countries' domestic politics, be it through the promotion of democracy and man rights or armed services interventions, for instance.³⁸ Russian federation highlights collaboration over help, something which is tempting to African leaders who view the W's outreach every bit patronising. African countries, in other words, tin can trust Russia as a strategic partner to counterbalance Western influence. The geopolitical potential of such an alignment is meaning: for instance, Russian federation has used its veto in the UN Security Quango to protect African countries from human being rights-related sanctions (Zimbabwe in 2008), while in 2014, 24 African countries abstained from the United nations General Associates Resolution condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea (and two opposed it).³⁹

Political tips and tricks

Russia is anything but an altruistic role player when information technology helps partners. Indeed, given that influence and disinformation operations are core tenets of Russian federation's foreign policy around the globe, why are the Kremlin'due south troll armies and political strategists not considered a threat in sub-Saharan Africa? The answer lies in the recent decline of military machine coups as a way to achieve regime change. While some observers saw the switch to a greater reliance on the processes of electoral commonwealth⁴⁰ equally a step towards a 4th wave of democratisation, the electoral climate in sub-Saharan Africa instead became toxic. Incumbents often resort to a multifariousness of means and subterfuges to rig the results of elections in their favour: taking control of the state apparatus, amending the constitution, changing electoral laws, dominating the media, making capricious arrests and detaining opponents, as well every bit engaging in electoral fraud and repression. Russian federation'due south disinformation toolbox and political technology instruments are later regarded as avails which can exist used to influence the polls, while limiting accountability and minimising the risks of authoritarian leaders' directly responsibleness in manipulating elections. Madagascar was amongst the first (and will not be the last) operations in this regard.⁴¹

Every bit for sub-Saharan civil society groups, they tend not to perceive Russian federation as a bigger threat than other powers that once more explicitly projected their influence and interests to the detriment of African ones (former colonial powers, the U.s.). Shut links between Russia and many African media outlets also ofttimes protect Moscow from negative exposure.⁴² Finally, Soviet soft power continues to play a role in shaping perceptions, as USSR-era educational and diplomatic ties created useful networks which still endure in Africa today. It is these networks that Russia is reviving and supporting to help sustain its current strategy.

Rational choice: low-costs, high-gains

Third, countries in sub-Saharan Africa are rational agents that determine which deportment are worth pursuing, and which are not, based on a cost-benefits analysis.⁴³ In a context of growing multipolar competition and an increased global supply of deals and investment offers, African countries are in the enviable position of being able to pick and cull their economic partners. This benefits both their collective agency (for example, in the pursuit of specific agendas in multilateral negotiations, such every bit the European union-African Union (AU) partnership or the Doha Development Agenda) and individual interests. From this bespeak of view, Russia represents an opportunity to diversify their partnership and investor base, while decreasing dependency on big lenders such as China, and, consequently, minimising the risks of falling into a debt trap.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Russian investments cover sectors that are at the top of many African governments strategic agendas, such as armaments and nuclear energy, and in which Russia has a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other global players. Russian federation's help, therefore, tends to come up at relatively depression costs and yield loftier gains by bypassing caveats or weather that restrict the margin of manoeuvre of many Western partners.

Best seller?

4th, the competition, or available alternatives, should be examined in order to understand Russian federation's attractiveness. Few other global actors currently offer a partnership that is as comprehensive as Russia's. Quondam colonial ties and conditionality hamper the entreatment of the European union and its member states, while the US nether the Trump assistants has decreased both security and political engagement in Africa and accompanied what is left with a rhetoric of disdain and neglect. The Gulf states' and Turkey's influence is vulnerable to Red Body of water rivalries and Bharat mainly focuses on high-tech development. Finally, an over-reliance on Mainland china and the sustainability of Chinese infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is becoming a source of concern in many African capitals.

Seen through all these lenses, it is piece of cake to sympathise why an expansion of trade volume between Russia and Africa from $20 billion to $40 billion, as appear past President Putin in Sochi, is non only a matter of 'how much money', merely finds deeper roots in Africa'due south bureau in a multipolar earth.

Is Russian federation in Africa the new normal?

Despite its attractiveness, project of Russian ability in Africa faces some limitations. Beginning, Russian federation'south share of influence in sub-Saharan Africa is nevertheless limited, and its approach has not been entirely successful. Despite the attention given to Russian private military contractors and artillery sales, and the loftier visibility of the Sochi Summit in the global media, Russia's levels of bilateral merchandise, political influence and military presence remain insufficiently low. Sometimes Russia is better at marketing its achievements than at actually accomplishing things. Russian mercenaries are reportedly only present in a few theatres, and not all of their engagements were successful.⁴⁵ Russia'due south 'bang-up render' to sub-Saharan Africa is therefore more than modest than the newspapers portray:⁴⁶ it is not part of a grand, hegemonic strategy, but is instead opportunistic, driven by geo-political imperatives and seeks to develop selected clientelist relations with authoritarian leaders.⁴⁷ Notwithstanding, while lacking strategic ambition, this arroyo has yet provided Russia with an entry bespeak.

Second, Russian knowledge of socio-political realities in Africa is poorer than imagined. Electoral influence and disinformation operations, for instance, have and so far been largely unsuccessful. In Republic of madagascar, the Russian operation did non event in President Rajaonarimampianina's re-ballot, and Russian agents made a late switch to campaign for his rival Rajoelina subsequently realising that the incumbent'southward chances of winning were negligible. Russia besides lacks the capacities and diplomatic infrastructure to engage with local communities and politico-ethnic groups across Africa, something which severely undermines the effectiveness of its agents. While Moscow has the ambition to get a major player in election operations, and it offers its support to African leaders at a competitive toll, it would still take several years and huge investments to develop the necessary network and know-how to accept significant impact. An important variable in this regard is besides the survival of those long-standing sub-Saharan African leaders which currently rely on Russian aid, as they are increasingly existence pushed out through democratic transitions.⁴⁸

Third, even if an upwards tendency for Russian military and political influence is causeless in the next five-x years, the return on investment for Russia could be exposed to geopolitical shocks, with the subsequent risk of undermining the state's global strategy. The main lesson from Soviet engagement in sub-Saharan Africa was that costs exceeded the benefits: a multipolar earth requires Russia to be resourceful, and may somewhen button the Kremlin to act so as to avoid being trapped in any geopolitical quagmires which lie outside the areas of its immediate strategic interest. Russia may therefore opt for a pragmatic foreign policy strategy, keeping costs depression just maximising the economic opportunities every bit much as possible, all the while keeping media attention high so equally to amplify its engagement.

Moscow lacks the capacities and diplomatic infrastructure to engage with local communities and political leader-indigenous groups across Africa.

Even with those limitations, there are important short- and long-term implications for the Eu. In the curt term, Russia's operations and deals in sub-Saharan Africa will not establish a direct threat to Europe, just may undermine Eu interests, external action and normative power in specific areas. For instance, Russian arms sales have had an impact on the mandate and effectiveness of the EU Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) in matters related to security sector reform (SSR) and the implementation of the integrated arroyo to support the transition process.⁴⁹ Elsewhere, in post-Bashir Sudan, Russian support to the Transitional Armed forces Quango and efforts to delegitimise the Sudanese opposition⁵⁰ are at odds with the European union's approach to support a peaceful transition, promote civilian dominion and condemn any course of violence and human rights abuses.⁵¹

In the long term, should Russia sustain and manage to calibration up its influence, the implications for Europe could incrementally worsen, expanding from single countries to the continental level, particularly if Russian soft power and disinformation campaigns help fuel anti-Western sentiment or hamper democratisation and good governance beyond sub-Saharan Africa. While information technology is unlikely that Russia will develop a continental grand strategy, the presence of a wide Russian-supported disinformation network or a patchwork expansion of private military companies would clash with EU objectives and values. Even so whatever the exact future scenario, information technology is clear that Russian federation is in that location to stay in sub-Saharan Africa, aslope other global powers.⁵²

When adjusting its strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa, it is vitally important for the EU to advisedly assess its priorities and role in the new African balance of ability. The bigger (and perhaps graver) risk for the Eu, from a strategic indicate of view, would exist to become the firefighter in a region where other players, including Russian federation, actively contribute to acts of political arson. To avoid that outcome, moving from beingness a donor to a fully-fledged geopolitical player is paramount; one which is able to deed using soft and, as required, difficult power tools. The EU'southward strategic approach will in particular need to residue European interests with the about pressing bug for sub-Saharan African countries, from employment to violent extremism. In this process, the quality of the relationship (and of EU concrete engagements) matters more the sheer quantity of Official Development Assist (ODA) or Foreign Directly Investment (FDI) flows – equally the Russian underdog arroyo shows.

As multipolarism becomes the new normal in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia's projection of influence is just one chemical element of a bigger systemic alter, just a potentially bonny and dangerous one for Africans if information technology becomes uncontrolled or contributes to aristocracy capture. Assuasive Russia to set new trends and establish operating bases to delegitimise European values and perceptions on the African continent would be strategically imprudent. Current EU foreign policy instruments, from electoral support to crisis response and prevention, need the flexibility to operate in an surround where assist should non simply be tailored to local needs, but be mindful of the growing impact of foreign influences. Beefing upwardly capacities for intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness, and reinforcing the political, press and information sections in EU Delegations could help to counter or deter the propaganda and disinformation operations of strange actors. At the politico-strategic level, re-assessing the relationship between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa in this new light should therefore be a priority as leaders from the two continents appoint in the post-Cotonou negotiations and approach the sixth AU-Eu Summit.

References

* The authors would like to thank Karol Luczka and Carlo Palleschi for their research assistance in writing this Brief.
1) Milene Charles, The Soviet Wedlock and Africa: the History of the Interest (United Printing of America: Washington, 1980), p. 137.
2) Walter Walker, The Bear at the Back Door (Foreign Affairs Publishing: Richmond, 1978), p. 9.
3) Kimberly Marten, "Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military machine", PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 561, January, 2019, http://world wide web.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm561_Marten_Jan2019_0.pdf.
four) "UNCTAD Analyses the Debt of sub-Saharan African Countries to non-OECD Official Creditors", Un Conference on Trade and Development, November 7, 1996, https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.aspx?ReferenceDocId=3737.
5) Vladimir Putin interview on Russian federation-Africa Summit in Sochi, Kremlin.ru, October 21, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858.
6) "Rosneft Eyes Africa, Former Soviet Posting of CEO", Reuters, April 23, 2014, https://world wide web.reuters.com/article/rosneft-oil-co-angola-oil/update-1-rosneft-eyes-africa-sometime-soviet-posting-of-ceo-idUSL6N0NF33U20140423.
seven) Russian expert'south remarks, airtight-door event, Moscow, 2019.
8) Olga Kulkova, "Povorot Rossii m Afrike: Kakovy Perspektivy? [Russia's plow to Africa: what perspectives?], Valdai Discussion Club, March 5, 2018, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/lukomorya-bolshe-net/?sphrase_id=38196.
9) Vadim Balytnikov et al., "Vozrashenie Rossii v Afriku: Strategia i Perspektivy [Russia'due south Return to Africa: Strategy and Perspectives]", Valdai Discussion Club, Oct, 2019, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/30230/.
10) Russian expert's remarks during a closed-door discussion, 2019.
11) Discussion with a Russian practiced, 2019.
12) "Nazad 5 SSSR: Chto Rossiya Delayet v Afrike" [Back to the USSR: what is Russia doing in Africa?], Gazeta.ru,  March 6, 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2018/03/05_a_11672185.shtml.
13) "Where Does Sudan Import Wheat From? (2010)", The Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.earth/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/sdn/show/1001/2010/; "Where does Sudan import wheat from? (2017)", Ibid., https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/sdn/testify/1001/2017/.
14) Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Nan Tian, "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2016", SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2017, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf.
15) Dan C. Heldman, The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy nether Khrushchev (Praeger Publishers: New York, 1981), p. 109
sixteen) Milene Charles, op. cit., pp. 91, 123.
17) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
xviii) Charles Milene, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
nineteen) George W. Breslauer, Soviet Policy in Africa (University of California: Berkeley, 1992), pp. 166-195.
20) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
21) Dan C. Heldman, op. cit., p.83, and "RDC: l'agence de presse Sputnik signe un accord de partenariat avec le radiodiffuseur national congolais", Agence Ecofin, May 24, 2019, https://www.agenceecofin.com/medias/2405-66458-rdc-l-agence-de-presse-sputnik-signe-united nations-accord-de-partenariat-avec-le-radiodiffuseur-national-congolais; "Sputnik widens its reach in Africa", Broadcast Media Africa, May 24, 2019, https://broadcastingandmedia.com/news/1951.
22) "Europe Sucked Wealth from Africa, in Debt to Continent", RT, May 26, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/scout?v=WITpoxF-BKg.
23) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
24) Vladimit Putin interview, op.cit.
25) Vladimir Frolov, "Glovokruzhenie ot Uspehov. I vo Vneshenei Politike Putin Pogruzilsea v Proshloe" [Dizzy from Success. Putin's Foreign Policy Inspires from Past], Republic, December 23, 2019, http://republic.ru/posts/95500?.
26) Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (Yale University Printing: New Oasis, 2005).
27) Daniil Turovskii, Vtorzhenie. Kratkaia Istoria Russkih Hakerov" [Invasion. A brusque History of Russian Hackers] (Individuum: Moscow, 2019), pp. 236-245.
28) Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Fashion, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Common cold War (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010).
29) Theo Neethling, "How Russia is growing its strategic influence in Africa", The Conversation, February 6, 2019, http://theconversation.com/how-russian federation-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930.
xxx) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
31) Press Release on Deputy Minister Mikhail Bogdanov's meeting with Chinese Administrator to Russia Zhang Hanhui, MID.ru, October 28, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3868709.
32) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
33) Expert's remarks during a closed-door give-and-take, 2020.
34) Judd Devermont, "The Art of Summitry", CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/art-summitry.
35) "Remarks by President Vladimir Putin at the Russian federation-Africa Tiptop, Sochi, October 24, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893.
36) In that location is a discrepancy between Russia trade with sub-Saharan Africa ($4.9 billion) and sub-Saharan Africa trade with Russia ($iii.8 billion), based on Globe Bank data.
37) Imf, Direction of Trade statistics, 2017. See as well: Dhruv Gandhi, "Africa's new trading partners", Brookings Establishment, March vii, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/03/07/figure-of-the-week-africas-new-trading-partners/.
38) Paul Stronski, "Late to the Political party: Russia'due south Render to Africa", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.
39) Martin Russell and Eric Pichon, "Russian federation in Africa: A new loonshit for geopolitical contest", Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2019, p. eight, https://www.europarl.europa.european union/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642283/EPRS_BRI(2019)642283_EN.pdf.
twoscore) Jakkie Cilliers, "The time to come of democracy in Africa", African Futures Paper, no. nineteen, Institute for Security Studies, October 2016, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/af19.pdf.
41) "Madagascar: les mystères de l'influence russe sur la présidentielle,"Jeune Afrique, Nov xiv, 2019, https://world wide web.jeuneafrique.com/856822/politique/madagascar-les-mysteres-de-linfluence-russe-sur-la-presidentielle/.
42) Anton Troianovski, "'A New Message': Russian federation Trains Its Propaganda Machine on Africa", The New York Times, Oct 29, 2019, https://world wide web.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/world/europe/africa-russia-sochi.html.
43) See, for case: Maddalena Procopio, "Why Russia is not like China in Africa", Commentary, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazioinale, November 15, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/why-russia-not-china-africa-24409.
44) Courtney Goldsmith, "Is a new debt crisis mounting in Africa?", Earth Finance, August 5, 2019, https://www.worldfinance.com/special-reports/is-a-new-debt-crisis-mounting-in-africa.
45) Martin Russell and Eric Pichon, op. cit., p. four.
46) Camillo Casola, Maddalena Procopio, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, "Russia in Africa: What'southward New?", Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November fifteen, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russia-africa-whats-new-24400; and Véronique Dussaussois, "La portée limitée du réinvestissement russe en Afrique subsaharienne", Les Carnets du CAPS – Centre d'analyse de prévision et de stratégie, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, no. 27, Eté-Automne 2019, p. 71-82.
47) Peter Fabricius, "From Russia with love – or perchance not?", ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, October 4, 2019, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/from-russia-with-honey-or-peradventure-non.
48) Alex Vines, "Africa'southward Long-continuing Leaders Are Disappearing", Chatham House, January 3, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/africa-s-long-standing-leaders-are-disappearing.
49) On EUTM-RCA, see: https://eeas.europa.european union/sites/eeas/files/20190919_mission_factsheet_eutm_rca.pdf.
50) Samuel Ramani, "Moscow'due south Hand in Sudan's Hereafter", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 11, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/79488.
51) Council of the Eu, "Sudan: Strange Affairs Council statement", Brussels, June 17, 2019: https://world wide web.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/17/sudan-foreign-diplomacy-council-statement/.
52) Alex Vines, "Global Engagement With Africa Continued to Surge in 2018", Chatham Firm, January viii, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/proficient/comment/global-engagement-africa-continued-surge-2018.

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Source: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/russias-forays-sub-saharan-africa

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